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Abstract—The Smart Grid (SG) is vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to its integration with a variety of information, communication and
control technologies. If undetected by deployed security systems, cyber-attacks could damage critical power system infrastructure and
disrupt service to a very large number of energy customers. In particular, cyber attackers could hijack the smart grid by injecting
malicious commands. To provide insight into these concerns, we propose an approach that develops a new tool for the real-time
Cyber-Physical Security Assessment (CPSA) of malicious control commands that target physical SG components. The tool is able to
detect and protect the system against known Trojans (such as BlackEnergy). It also efficiently and effectively monitors the health of the
power system in real-time and detects the presence of malicious commands. The security analysis of our approach includes a look at
three system-generated metrics: system susceptibility, access points, and threat capability. The performance analysis includes a look
at the system overhead, scalability, accuracy, robustness, and execution and response time. Our proposed approach was tested on a
42-bus power system with 24 substations. The developed tool could be extended and used by power system operators to assess and
mitigate the impact of cyber-attacks on the smart grid.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical system, malicious control command, smart grid.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
O VER the past few years, cyber-physical security of theSmart Grid (SG) has become an increasingly critical
research direction due to several recent cyber-attack at-
tempts on the SG in different countries and successful cyber-
attacks such as the attack on the Ukranian power system[2].
Today, the SG is more vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to
its integration with different communication technologies,
including in some applications, the Internet. Despite how
important power system cyber-security is, today’s system
don’t have a capability to develop real-time cyber-physical
security situational awareness. Cyber-Physical Security As-
sessment (CPSA) is necessary in order to examine the impact
of failure or attack through cyber-elements on the physical
operation of the power system. This can be accomplished
through modeling and simulation of cyber events on the
power system using a real-time co-simulator or through a
hardware testbed setup.
The best practice for CPSA is to analyze the direct
cyber-physical impact of specific cyber-attacks on the power
system, which is not limited to previously observed cyber
vulnerabilities of the given power system. To achieve this
goal, a comprehensive and re-configurable cyber-physical
co-simulator that can be used to model and simulate cyber
events is required. In this paper, we describe a cyber-
physical co-simulator for real-time communication and
• N. Saxena is with the Department of Computing and Informatics,
Bournemouth University, UK.
E-mail: nsaxena@ieee.org
• L. Xiong, V. Chukwuka and S. Grijalva are with the School of Electrical
& Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA.
E-mail: leileix@gatech.edu, vchukwuka3@gatech.edu, sgri-
jalva@ece.gatech.edu
Manuscript received XXXX XX, 20XX; revised XXX XX, 20XX.
power system simulation. Our co-simulator is then used to
evaluate the impact of malicious control commands on a test
power system. The considered power system contains a cen-
tral Control Center (CC), which communicates with down-
stream substation Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) through
intermediate routers. Generators, buses, loads, transformers,
and capacitor banks are present at the various substations.
1.1 Motivation and Research Problem
The power industry is facing potential cyber-attacks that can
impact the power grid with serious implications. Our work
is motivated by recent cyber-attacks on real power systems
(such as the Ukraine attacks in December 2015 and February
2016 [2]). The Ukraine power grid was brought down by
cyber-attacks, which left 80,000 people in dark for six hours,
and more than two months after the attack, the control cen-
ters were still not fully operational [2]. The attacks targeted
IT staff and system administrators of companies responsible
for distributing electricity. They delivered email to work-
ers with a malicious Word document attached. Clicking
on and selecting the attachment enabled macros for the
document injected BlackEnergy (which have infected other
systems in Europe and the US) into workers’ machines.
The attackers accessed the Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) networks through the hijacked Virtual
Private Networks (VPNs), sent commands to disable the
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) systems, and opened
up transmission lines breakers at numerous substations.
This causes a broad power blackout. It is evident that well-
planned and well-executed cyber-attacks through malicious
control commands can potentially disconnect power devices
and leave hundreds of thousands of energy consumers in
the dark. Therefore, it is very important to evaluate and
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understand the resiliency of the power grid against cyber-
attacks to develop new solutions to safeguard the system.
Incident responses, security risk evaluation, and vulner-
ability analysis have not been standardized in the smart
grid environment. Although there are certain standards
assessing security aspects of the smart grid, such as by the
European Commission [10], EU Distribution System Opera-
tors (DSO) [23], European Union Agency for Network and
Information Security (ENISA) [8], European Telecommuni-
cations Standards Institute (ETSI) Smart Grid Coordination
Group [5], National Institute of Science and Technology’s
NISTIR 7628 [21], and NIST framework [20]. However, some
of them are either not enough to handle Advance Persistent
Threat (APT) in the smart grid environment or not fully
implemented by the service providers inline with the com-
pliance. In fact, the cyber and physical interactions of power
components and devices interactions are not well under-
stood. A cyber threat may lead to damage of critical power
infrastructure or significantly impact, potentially even dis-
able critical functions of the Energy Management System
(EMS) due to inappropriate responses. With the knowledge
that cyber-physical insecurities exist in the power system
and cannot be completely eliminated, our goal is to reduce
these insecurities to an acceptable level. Existing tools are
not capable of effectively evaluating the health of the power
system in the presence of cyber-attacks.
1.2 Challenges
In order to gain insight and better understanding on the
inter-dependencies of cyber and power elements in the
smart grid, an integrated co-simulator is developed. The
co-simulator model overall cyber-physical control loop in-
cluding operator decisions under attack scenarios. It will
provide the security and performance assessment on the
overall health of the entire system. The assessment on future
vulnerable states and situational awareness in the presence
of different cyber-attacks can also be achieved by a co-
simulator. Implications of cyber-physical system under dif-
ferent communication scenarios, such as reliable, unreliable,
limited bandwidth and limited allowed data size can also
be studied. However, accurate and correct modeling and
simulation of the dynamic behavior of the smart grid is
quite challenging as the smart grid is a large and complex
structure comprises with millions of the components, such
as loads, generators and transformer tied together by hun-
dreds of thousands of miles of transmission and distribution
wires and integrated with a large number of control devices.
In addition, the communication network connected to the
smart grid generally comprises of thousands of communi-
cation nodes, several communication routers, computation
and communication servers, and authentication servers.
Hence, it is quite difficult to clearly understand the dynamic
behavior and inter-dependencies between the both systems.
1.3 Contributions
Our contributions are as follows:
1) Development of a tool for cyber-physical security assess-
ment of cyber-attacks targeting physical SG components.
This tool would help operators make an appropriate control
decision by simulating the impact of the potentially mali-
cious commands on the power system in real-time.
2) A method that helps operators to detect and protect the
system thhrough an IDS against known malicious software
(Trojans) used for spamming and attacking the power grid.
3) Introduction of a specific and system wide security metric
for real-time situational awareness. Simulation of a set of
relevant use cases in a realistic but small system.
4) Efficiently and securely monitoring of the power system
security in real-time and output logs generation for the
operator in 5 sec. to evaluate if any malicious commands
target power system components.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II discusses the existing work related to cyber-attacks
on the power system. Section III describes the system model,
the threat model, and our goals to be achieved. We propose
an approach towards simulating the malicious control com-
mand cyber-attack and monitoring its impact on the power
system in Section IV. Section V presents a discussion about
security and performance analysis of the proposed approach
along with its limitations. Finally, Section VI concludes this
work and highlights future directions.
2 RELATED WORK
In order to accurately evaluate the current security of the
power system, a cyber-physical security assessment of the
joint communication-power system is required, rather than
simply examining the cyber-security concerns in only the
communication network or the impact of physical events on
the power system. However, research in this area has not
been fully explored. First, we discuss the works related to
cyber security followed by the research on cyber-physical
system security in the SG.
Chen et al. [6] discussed different categories of attacks:
vulnerability, data injection and intentional attacks, and
analyzed network robustness. Tran et al. [29] proposed a
detection scheme for replay attacks in the SG. Yang et al.
[32] discussed Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing-
based Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks. Wei et al. [30]
performed a study on modeling Denial-of-Service (DoS)-
resilient communication routing in the SG. Liu et al. [19]
presented a framework that models a class of cyber-physical
switching vulnerabilities. Etigowni et al. [9] presents a
cyber-physical access control solution by using information
flow analysis based on mathematical models of the physical
grid to generate policies enforced through verifiable logic.
Sgouras et al. [26] made an attempt to assess the impact
of cyber-attacks on the Advanced Metering Infrastructure
(AMI), specifically considering DoS and Distributed DoS
(DDoS) attacks. Yi et al. [33] presented a DoS attack scenario
that lowers packet delivery rate by 10-20% in the AMI
network. Srikantha et al. [27] considered the effect of a DoS
attack on the power system. Hahn et al. [13] introduced a
security model to represent privilege states and evaluated
viable attack paths in the AMI network. Liu et al. [18]
analyzed the impacts of a line outage attack, DoS attack, and
MITM attack on the physical power grid using an integrated
cyber-power modeling and simulation testbed.
The above mentioned solutions have limitations, which
could be further improved. In [6], [32], [26], [33], [13] and
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[9], the impact of attacks on the power system was not
studied, whereas the scheme in [29] does not consider the
source of the cyber-attacks as being from the communication
network, rather directly injected into the power system.
The simulation work in [30] only included a 3-generator
system, which is small to fully understand the impact of
these attacks on real power systems. The communication
network is not considered in quantifying the cyber-physical
system impact in [19] and [27].
TABLE 1: Communication Attacks Targeted on Smart Grid
Attack Type Authors Work Studied Power
System Impact?
Data injection Chen et al. [6] No
Replay Tran et al. [29] Yes
ARP spoofing MITM Yang et al. [32] No
DoS Wei et al. [30] Yes
Switching vulnerabilities Liu et al. [19] Yes
Access control Etigowni et al. [9] No
DoS and DDoS Sgouras et al. [26] No
DoS Yi et al. [33] No
DoS Srikantha et al. [27] Yes
Viable attacks paths Hahn et al. [13] No
Line outage, DoS, MITM Liu et al. [18] Yes
Hahn et al. [12] described a cyber-physical testbed. Yan et
al. [31] summarized the cyber security requirements and the
possible vulnerabilities in smart grid communications and
proposed solutions. However, neither of these work model
cyber-attacks to understand the physical impact of cyber-
attacks on the power system. Godfrey et al. [11] represented
an analytical model of the communication network to exam-
ine the effect of communication failures as a function of the
radio frequency (RF) transmission power level. The paper
discusses the transmission of various messages with power
quantities and observe the communication delay. However,
it does not detect or alert any malicious message and also
does not measure the impact of such change on the power
system behavior. Kundur et al. [17] focused on the model
synthesis stage for both cyber and physical grid entity
relationships as directed graphs to derive a framework for
cyber-attack impact analysis of a smart grid with a case
study. However, the work does not perform any simulation
and also does not consider physical impact on the power
system. The paper [33] performs a simulation of packet rate,
but it does study the impact of the attack on the power sys-
tem. Aditya et al. [3] proposed a game-theoretic framework
to model cyber-physical security for Wide-Area Monitoring,
Protection and Control (WAMPAC) applications, whereas
the proposed work in this paper is more analytical and is
dependent on the outcomes of each timestep iteration and
the current state of the power system. The advantages of
the approach in [3] include articulation and understanding
of cyber-attacks (threat timing, data integrity, and replay
attacks) and coordinated attacks. However, our work targets
malicious command (injection or forgery) attacks on the
power system. The work in [3] focuses potential attacks
on the communication network without considering their
impact on the power system. In summary, none of these
papers actually determine the physical impact of the attacks
on the system and do not provide a security assessment
metric. This is a big difference on impact between stealing
a credit card or a billing record, and disconnecting a power
plant. We tackled this challenge in the proposed work, as
we believe that the future smart grid must be resilient and
support fault-tolerant system.
The studies of cyber-physical systems found in literature
are based on traditional attacks, such as MITM, DoS, and
DDoS as mentioned in Table 1. These attacks are achieved
by injecting false data or targeting the device to stop its
functionality. However, there is no study carried out for ma-
licious/false command injection in the SG, where an adver-
sary can potentially isolate the critical power components by
disconnecting them from the rest of the power system. We
tackle this issue of impact monitoring of the cyber-physical
system by using a cyber-physical co-simulator.
3 SYSTEM MODEL, THREAT MODEL, AND GOALS
In this section, we present a smart grid system model, a
threat model, and the specific goals of this research.
3.1 System Model
We introduced a smart grid system model as shown in
Figure 1 that consists of a single control center with an EMS,
where a power systems operator makes operation and con-
trol decisions, and numerous downstream substations, each
of which contains an RTU. The communication between the
RTUs and the control center is provided through two routers
(Router 1 and Router 2). The smart grid power systems layer
consists of multiple stages: electricity generation, trans-
mission, distribution, and consumption by the end users
(known as loads). Electricity is typically produced by large-
scale generation, which can include nuclear power plants,
thermal power plants (fueled by coal, oil, or natural gas),
hydroelectric plants, and nondispatchable renewables (such
as wind and solar farms). In order to reduce resistive losses
that can occur during long-distance transmission, electricity
is stepped up to a high voltage at nearby substations by
power transformers before it is sent across a network of
transmission lines. Once it reaches substations near the
end customers, it is stepped down in voltage by a series
of transformers before it is ultimately used by industrial,
commercial, or residential loads.
Fig. 1: Power system model consisting of a single control
center and multiple substations, each consists with an RTU.
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Substations serve as transition points between genera-
tion and load. In addition to power transformers, substa-
tions also contain circuit breakers that provide the ability to
connect or disconnect equipment as well as busbar (here-
after referred to as buses), which are metal bars that con-
nect high voltage equipment in the substation switchyard.
They may also contain capacitor banks, which are used to
correct power factor issues caused by inductive loads in
the system, improve voltage stability, and reduce network
losses. One of the key assumptions behind the design of
the smart grid is that the amount of electricity generated
and the amount of electricity consumed are balanced at any
given time. The alternating current electricity operates at
60 or 50Hz. Thus, the balancing of power is very delicate
and fast. For instance loss of a large generating unit is
felt almost immediately throughout the system and actions
to balance the system are initiated in milliseconds and
balancing usually takes a few seconds. Cyber-attacks that
seek to drastically disrupt this balance have the potential
to cause widespread cascading power outages. Also, cyber-
attacks could seek to destroy critical equipment such as
generators and bulk power transformers, which are costly
to replace and typically have very long lead times. Power
systems are operated with physical security in mind so as
to avoid large blackouts that can happen under equipment
failure, weather events, physical or cyber-attacks. In this
paper, we study the impact of malicious control commands
that have the potential to reduce the security of the power
system. These commands could include opening generator
circuit breakers, which may create a sudden imbalance
between generation and load that could cause system-wide
problems. Each substation contains multiple buses, power
transformers, circuit breakers, and capacitor banks.
In the power system we consider that there are 24 sub-
stations, each equipped with one RTU. During the polling
request, the control center asks each substation RTU to
send its available measurement data. All polled RTUs send
their data back to the control center as a response. In a
real scenario, this communication takes place either over
an insecure network or via VPN. However, there is still a
chance that an adversary could modify the measurement
data before it leaves the substation. In real operation, the
power system operator can also send control commands to
the substation RTU in order to take an appropriate action to
mitigate the impact of events on the overall power system.
These commands include: setting a generator operating
point, opening/closing a circuit breaker, and connecting/
disconnecting a capacitor bank.
Power system measurements are modeled as follows.
Let z represent a set of available measurements. Then
z = h(x)+e, where x is the estimated state vector (bus volt-
ages represented in phasor form as magnitudes and angles),
h is the vector of functions relating the state variables to the
error-free measurements, and e is a vector of measurement
errors, which are assumed to have a Gaussian distribution
with mean 0 and variance σ2. There are five types of
measurements considered in h: real and reactive injection
measurements, real and reactive power flow measurements,
and voltage measurements. The expressions for real and
reactive power injection at bus i are [1]:
Pi = Vi
∑
j∈Ni
Vj (Gij cosθij +Bij sinθij)
Qi = Vi
∑
j∈Ni
Vj (Gij sinθij −Bij cosθij)
where Vi denotes the voltage at bus i, Ni represents the
set of buses adjacent to bus i, Gij and Bij are the real and
imaginary components of the admittance matrix, and θij
is the difference of the angles between buses i and j. The
expressions for real and reactive power flow from bus i to
bus j are:
Pij = V
2
i (gsi + gij)− Vi Vj(gij cosθij + bij sinθij)
Qij = −V 2i (bsi + bij)− Vi Vj(gij sinθij − bij cosθij)
where gij + j bij represents the series impedance and
gsi+j bsi represents the shunt impedance of a line from bus
i to bus j based on the two-port pi-model of a transmission
line. If there is no communication error and no adver-
sarial manipulation, a power system measurement would
be exactly equal to h(x). If there was only noise and no
adversarial manipulation, state estimation could filter out
the Gaussian error from z. However, in the presence of an
attack where an adversary does modify a measurement,
then z would no longer be equal to the correct h(x) plus
a random Gaussian error.
3.2 Threat Model
We describe our cyber security threat model with respect to
the SG system as follows:
1) System Susceptibility: The adversary can perform sus-
picious and/or malicious activities including attempts to
access the login credentials of the operator and/or device,
transmission of fake/bad commands, such as opening a
circuit breaker connected to a substation device, and dis-
turbing network communications and packet data. The ad-
versary will attempt to discover and exploit these suscepti-
bilities in order to compromise (modify or control) critical
power system infrastructure, information and operations.
2) Adversary’s Capability: We assume that the adversary is ca-
pable of performing a MITM attack by altering or replacing
a legitimate command, injecting a malicious command, or
accessing the control center to send a legitimate command
as an insider attacker.
3) Adversary’s Accessibility: We assume that the adversary
has knowledge of the communication network topology
as well as the power system topology. The adversary also
has enough resources to perform the required malicious or
suspicious actions and has accessibility to the system.
We have considered three attack scenarios as follows: In
first attack scenario, the attacker sends a false but legitimate
command from a location other than the control center to the
generator breaker over an insecure network. In second at-
tack scenario, the adversary modifies a legitimate command
transmitted from the control center to the generator breaker
over an insecure network. In third attack scenario, the ad-
versary acts as an insider attacker who has access privileges
for sending a legitimate command to the generator breaker.
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3.3 Goals
We present the following goals to be achieved in this cyber-
physical SG system:
1) Critical Components: The primary goal of the adversary is
to target critical power components, such as generators and
transformers, in order to damage the power system or cause
a service interruption. The adversary could also target the
routers to explore and access the communication system and
exploit vulnerabilities. Our goals are to perform a regular
security analysis, detect any such suspicious activity and
attempt to deny illegitimate access.
2) Key Assets: Key assets are the pieces of critical information
that the adversary will seek. These key assets could be
information about a regular schedule for polling opera-
tions at a specific substation or the IP address and other
communications related information for the control center.
With these assets the adversary can later spoof the control
center and try to inject a malicious command. Our goal is to
identify this malicious activity and prevent such injections
in the real power system.
3) Detection, Reaction, and Adaptation: In the worst case, the
adversary successfully performs an undetected malicious
action, such as injecting a malicious command. Our goal is
to simulate the worst case scenario and analyze the potential
impact of malicious command on the power system either
in study mode, or upon detection of a suspicious command.
4 OUR APPROACH
In this section, we present our approach, discuss specific
use cases for malicious command injection, describe the
behavior on and impact monitoring of the cyber-physical
power system, design malicious command countermeasure,
and evaluate the impact of control operation on the cyber-
physical power system.
4.1 Use Case Scenarios
An adversary can perform a malicious command injection
attack by sending a false control command to a substation
RTU. If the adversary does not have complete knowledge
of the system and simply injects a false command at ran-
dom, the operator should be able to identify and stop the
execution of the malicious command on the power system.
Also, if the adversary has complete or partial knowledge
of the system, it can purposefully inject a specific malicious
command to damage the system at large. If an adversary
targets a command from a malicious source, such as a
fabricated command to detach a generator, the IDS will be
able to detect the command and prevent its execution on the
power system. If an adversary models a smart command,
which is legitimate but unwanted and seems to be a routine
operation, such as slightly reduce power generation at any
specific point in time, the IDS probably will not be correctly
able to detect it. However, it will alert and send a notification
of suspicious behavior (considering threshold values and %
of change in values) to the operator. We also note that there
are automatic commands issued by the control center, with-
out the involvement of the operator, such as those generated
by the Automatic Generation Control (AGC) function. These
commends are sent to all the generating units in a power
system every few seconds. While all the commands pass
through the IDS, which is very fast, only those suspect will
be blocked and sent to the operator for simulation. One
example of a malicious command that could significantly
impact the power system is the opening of the circuit
breaker connected to the largest generator in the system.
We discuss three specific scenarios as follows:
Use Case 1: Adversary impersonates the network and
sends a false (unwanted) but legitimate command outside
of the control center to breaker of the largest generator.
Effects on the Communication Network: Under this
attack, we can observe and monitor several effects on the
communication system, such as: (i) the Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) notifies the control center operator what com-
mand it received. The operator verifies whether the com-
mand is legitimate, and (ii) a false command was issued to
the substation RTU connected to the breaker of the targeted
generator.
Effects on the Power System: If this attack is successful,
we can observe the following impacts on the power system:
(i) insecure operation(s) of the power system, and (ii) possi-
ble shedding of electrical load.
Use Case Steps: 1) The attacker targets a command as
mentioned as (a) in threat model.
2) IDS detects a suspicious malicious command (based on
its rules engine, such as IP address, port number, etc.) and
notifies the operator. The operator verifies that the control
center did not issue this command.
3) CPSA performs power flow and cyber-physical contin-
gency analysis to evaluate the effect of the command on the
power system if it was allowed to go through and discovers
that the system is insecure, indicating that the command
was malicious.
4) The operator discards the command. Secure system oper-
ation is restored.
Use Case 2: Adversary fabricates or modifies a le-
gitimate command sent to a generator breaker over an
insecure network.
Effects on the Communication Network: Same as in use
case 1, except the legitimate command was modified over
the network.
Effects on the Power System: Same as in use case 1.
Use Case Steps: 1) The attacker sends a command as
mentioned as (b) in threat model.
2) The IDS does not detect the command modification, but
still sends a notification to the operator. The operator verifies
that the control center did not issue the command.
3) Same as use case 1 step 3.
4) CPSA asks IT personnel for attack information with a
response that there is suspicion of a MITM attack.
5) Same as use case 1 step 4.
Use Case 3: Adversary as an insider attacker (other per-
son) at the control center sends a legitimate but unwanted
command to the generator breaker.
Effects on the Communication Network: The operator
receives a command notification from the IDS and finds
the transmitted legitimate command was not issued by
him/her. In the worst case scenario, the operator ignores
the notification and allows the execution of the command
on the power system.
Effects on the Power System: Same as in use case 1.
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Use Case Steps: 1) The attacker sends a command as
mentioned as (c) in threat model.
2) The IDS does not detect the insider attack and notifies
the operator that it is a legitimate command. The operator
verifies that the received command is the same as what was
issued from the control center.
3) Generator breaker receives a false command and trips.
4) CPSA runs contingency analysis and discovers that the
system is insecure, indicating that the command was legiti-
mate but false (unwanted).
5) CPSA asks the IT personnel for attack information with
the response that there is suspicion of an insider attack. Thus
CPSA prompts the operator to reclose the breaker.
6) If the breaker does not respond after 20 seconds, CPSA
will prompt the operator to initiate the appropriate remedial
action after which secure system operation is restored.
4.2 Cyber-Physical Behavior Impact Monitoring
In this section, we discuss cyber-physical attack impact
monitoring using log-based and host-based system monitor-
ing, IDS, cyber-physical simulation, and attacks modeling.
4.2.1 Log-based and Host-based System Monitoring
One of our modules performs host-based system monitor-
ing, which involves malicious URLs, masks, and botnet
Control & Command (C&C) URLs. This module scans ma-
licious and botnet URLs whenever communicates (send or
receive) over the HTTP. This module also scans MD5/SHA1
hashes of the malicious object database and computes a hash
of each object before accessing it. One of the malwares used
in the Ukraine power system attack in December 2015 was
BlackEnergy [22]. BlackEnergy is a Trojan that sneaks into
the computer with shared programs when users download
or update programs from the Internet or via spam email
attachments or hacked web sites. Some of the detected
Trojans used by BlackEnergy include:
Backdoor.Win32.Blakken, Backdoor.Win64.Blakken
Backdoor.Win32.Fonten, Heur:Trojan.Win32.Generic
BlackEnergy also uses executables as malicious drivers
contained in the configuration files and tries to extract a
list of proxy servers locally used in corporate networks. We
monitor the malware samples (Win. drivers) used in the
Ukraine attack [16], some of them are:
amdide.sys (SHA1: 2D805BCA41AA0EB1FC7EC3BD944EFD7DBA686AE1)
aliide.sys (SHA1: C7E919622D6D8EA2491ED392A0F8457E4483EAE9)
acpipmi.sys (SHA1: 0B4BE96ADA3B54453BD37130087618EA90168D72)
aliide.sys (SHA1: C7E919622D6D8EA2491ED392A0F8457E4483EAE9)
adpu320.sys (MD5: 2D805BCA41AA0EB1FC7EC3BD944EFD7D)
acpipmi.sys (MD5: 0B4BE96ADA3B54453BD37130087618EA)
Another way of injecting a Trojan is to spam email the
power system operator with malicious macro enabled MS
Word or Excel document. This was the strategy utilized by
the adversaries on the Ukraine power grid during which the
adversaries were able to compromise three operators. Upon
receiving the document, the operators curiously opened the
document and clicked yes when it asked to enable a macro.
As a result, the enabled macro injected a BlackEnergy Trojan
into the computer system, which has the capability of hiding
itself deep in the system and corrupting the anti-virus files
to disable scanning activity. This Trojan also drops a KillDisk
virus that corrupts the master boot sector on the disk. As
a result, the compromised system cannot reboot. In order
to protect the systems against macro-enabled BlackEnergy
Trojans in MS Word or Excel documents, we use a technique
to verify whether a document has enabled macros and to
extract its content. To extract the macros from a document
without running Excel or Word, we use a tool called ole-
dump (object linking and embedding tool) [7].
4.2.2 Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
The IDS deployed (mirror image) at each substation scans
every DNP3 packet sent and received by the substation
RTU. The IDS also notifies the operator about each control
command it receives and requests verification. Suricata [28]
can be used for the IDS implementation, which is an open
source implementation and provides rich functionality for a
customized IDS system. Suricata evaluates functions on net-
work messages and performs DNP3 deep packet inspection.
The rules of the IDS are developed using Domain Specific
Language (DSL), which are binary valued functions. The
IDS functionality (such as verifying read and write DNP3
commands) is modeled using Java Script Object Notation
(JSON). JSON provides specific classes, groups, and iden-
tifiers to represent the rules. The IDS scans the received
DNP3 packet from the Distributed State Estimator (DSE)
[15], triggers the specific rule based on filters applied to the
packet, and passes it to the control center, if the packet is
not malicious. If the packet is suspected to be malicious, the
IDS sends a notification (an alarm) to the control center. The
IDS combines signature and behavioral analysis to protect
the system against known, unknown, and advanced threats.
Detecting suspicious behavior involves several factors, such
as measurement data threshold, protocol modifications, and
tracking IP addresses and port numbers. We also perform
a traffic analysis on received packets using Wireshark with
the jpcap/WinPcap tool.
We also examine the communication patterns over sev-
eral nodes (RTUs, control center ports, and routers). The
process is carried out over an extended period of several
days as opposed to micro-examination, since the IDS alerts
on specific protocol patterns tend to generate many false
positives. We also impose strong policies for role-based and
attribute-based access control, and encryption for securing
last mile communications [25].
4.2.3 Cyber-Physical Simulation
This co-simulator tool assesses the overall security of the
entire system, and allows management of the communica-
tion links (by controlling the baud rate, propagation delay,
and Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU)) and the substa-
tions topology (connection of nodes and routers). In the co-
simulator, all communication nodes interact with each other
using a message passing protocol. We use a star commu-
nication topology to connect RTUs with a router (Router-
1). This router is connected to another router (Router-2),
which is connected to the control center. We also devel-
oped a predictive global state estimator that supports fast
modeling and simulation. The co-simulator and distributed
state estimator allow the development of more advanced
security measures including: estimation of future vulnerable
states, identification of suspicious system behavior, and
measurement of the effects of different attacks attempted
through the communication network on the power system.
The co-simulator is built using Java-based GridSim and
Java Agent DEvelopment Framework (JADE) in conjunction
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with MATLAB and PowerWorld. The co-simulator allows
the centralized monitoring of link latency and bandwidth
values as the power system and control network state
evolves. The co-simulator is capable of detecting anomalies
and misbehavior in the combined power and cyber layers of
the SG system. This tool will be directly utilized by opera-
tors of interconnected power grids for detection of cyber-
attacks and provide cyber security and decision-making
capabilities. This co-simulator simulates the communication
network with realistic parameters: data rate, propagation
delay, number of packets, size of each packet, number of
devices including RTUs and routers and network topology.
The simulator also got functionality to develop and run
power system algorithms: power flow, observability anal-
ysis, state estimation and N-1 contingency analysis, where
N is the number of power components in the system. We
simulated a communication network with 24 substation
RTUs and performed a cyber-physical security assessment
on a 42-bus power system. The simulation is expensive,
which requires a specific scenario with dynamic topology to
simulate and also has a latency requirement of generating
each output file in 4-5 sec. Therefore, it is not recommended
to simulate every action, but only the suspicious commands
identified by the IDS and selected by the operator.
4.2.4 Attack Modeling
We model the malicious command injection attack and mon-
itor the impact of command execution on the power system
using our co-simulator. An adversary can send a malicious
command encapsulated in a DNP3 packet from the control
center (as an insider attacker) or from any other location
(with a different IP address or spoofed IP and pretends
to be a legitimate IP address of the control center) to the
substation RTU, which has a specific IP address and a port
number. Once the operator receives the malicious command
attack information, it uses the co-simulator to model the
malicious command injection attack scenario.
4.3 Designing Malicious Command Countermeasure
In this subsection, we design the countermeasure against
malicious command injection attacks.
Pre-conditions: The IDS notifies the operator about a
malicious command based on its rule formation and com-
mand pattern matching. We simulate the system to predict
and generate future states of the power system for the next
40 seconds based on the current power system state. The
simulation lasts for 40 seconds with 8 timesteps where each
timestep represents a 5 seconds interval, as one cycle of
cyber-physical simulation with 8 timesteps takes 40 seconds
to generate the output files and security metrics. Generating
a single output file takes 5 seconds, which is fast enough for
making an appropriate decision. An attack can be targeted
at a specific timestep.
Main Process: We use our co-simulator for assessing the
effect of a command over the communication network.
1) The co-simulator models a communication scenario,
which maps the real communication network parameters.
These parameters are as follows: the baud rate = 1572864
bits/sec, propagation delay = 300 ms, command = “CC →
RTU: Send Measurement Values-”, packet buffer size at the
CC = 180 bytes and packet buffer size at the RTU = 1500
bytes. The propagation delay is estimated based on the
number of bits transmitted in a packet over the network
with a specific speed. We considered network speed as 8.51
Mbps with a packet transmitting 2553K bits needs to set a
propagation delay of 300 ms.
2) We model and perform a single attack as malicious
command injection operation, and the command type as
“Change Generator Status” to open a generator breaker is
sent at timestep 5 of 8 iterations.
3) The IDS suspects the command is not a “legitimate com-
mand” based on its rules filtration and pattern matching.
Thereafter, the IDS sends an alert message to the CC as
shown in Figure 2.
4) The operator at the CC views the command sent log
information and finds that the command was not initiated
by him/her. The operator decides to simulate the command
and observe its effect on the power system. The role of IDS is
critical here that notifies the operator about a cyber incident,
which is not a normal power routine operation.
5) The operator sets up the communication parameters as
shown in Figure 3.
Expected Result: The adversary is able to inject a mali-
cious command at a specific time. The simulation is initiated
and at timestep 5, a malicious command is suspected. The
IDS sends an alert message through the IDS-operation no-
tification interface. This alert message prompts the operator
for the next action - simulate or reject the command as
shown in Figure 2. The operator decides to simulate the ef-
fect of the malicious command, generates the attack output
file, and finally allows or rejects the command execution on
the real power system as shown in Figure 4.
Post-conditions: A malicious command is successfully
injected and simulated, and the power system state is eval-
uated. Based on load forecast information (which has a very
small error of approximately 2%) derived from historical
data, we simulate the expected normal operational behavior
of the power system (under no attack) for 8 iterations. The
result of this simulation is stored in files and is adopted as
the baseline case. Simulations of different attack scenarios
are be compared with the baseline case to characterize the
systems deviations from the normal operations. Then, these
forecasted data files are compared to the files generated in
real-time. An attack is identified if the real results differ
significantly from the projected results. These characteriza-
tions are then used in developing metrics that are used for
evaluating the cyber-physical security of the system. In this
scenario, at timestep 5, the real results are compared against
the projected normal operational results at timestep 5. Then,
a decision to reject or allow the execution of said command
Fig. 2: An alert message sent from the RTU to the CC.
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Fig. 3: A command simulation GUI at the CC.
Fig. 4: Final decision to accept or reject the command.
on the power system is made by the operator, and the RTU
is notified with the appropriate action.
4.4 Cyber-Physical Control Impact Evaluation
We observe the cyber-physical impact of different attacks on
the power system with different setting preferences in the
Wide Area Communication Network (WACN). The param-
eters to vary are the baud rate, propagation delay, number
of transmitted packets and MTU of each packet.
4.4.1 Pre-Attacks Power System Security Evaluation
In order to clearly present our evaluation of the power
system health, we study different power components de-
ployed over the 24-substations. The polling requests (a read
command) from the CC to different substations’ RTUs are
initiated every 5 seconds. Upon receiving the request, each
RTU acknowledges the request and starts the process of
gathering field measurements. Then each RTU prepares to
send the measurement value packets over the wide area net-
work. Similarly, once the CC receives these packets from the
RTU, the CC sends an acknowledgment to each respective
RTU. The sent power system measurements include active
and reactive line power (LineMW, LineMVR), bus voltage
and angle (BusPUVolt, BusRad), generator active and re-
active power (GenMW, GenMVR) and voltage (GenVolt),
load active and reactive power (LoadMW, LoadMVR), and
transformer tap ratio (LineTap). In addition, the operator
performs control actions in order to balance the demand-
supply of power. These actions include changing the status
(open/close) of circuit breakers connected to various power
system components, such as transmission lines (LineStatus),
generators (GenStatus), loads (LoadStatus), transformers
(modeled as LineStatus) and shunt capacitors (SSStatus).
4.4.2 Post-Attacks Power System Security Evaluation
In this scenario, we monitor the behavior of the power
system as discussed in the previous subsection under a
malicious command injection attack. Detailed analysis of
our approach provides a quantitative basis for standard-
ized security metrics. Closely observing and utilizing these
metrics improve our ability to understand, control, and
better defend against cyber-attacks. Multiple metrics from
different perspectives are usually needed in order to detect
and identify the real threats. We formulate the following
cyber-physical security metrics using our co-simulator [14]:
1. System Susceptibility Metric: This system construction met-
ric reflects a way to minimize the number of access points
to system critical functions and components. This metric
is a direct consequence of identification and verification
of suspicious activities (data and command transmission)
on the power system components, including the critical
components.
2. Access Points Metric: The goal of utilizing this metric is to
minimize the amount of I/O and system process visibility to
an attacker. This metric is a direct consequence of detecting
malicious activities on different access points throughout the
integrated system.
3. Threat Capability Metric: Minimize useful insight into
system operations in the sense that data observed at one
time by the attacker may or may not be similar or consistent
with data observed at another time. This dynamic metric
helps to protect the system against targeted attacks.
5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the security and performance
analysis of our approach along with its limitations.
5.1 Security Analysis
The security analysis of the integrated cyber-physical sys-
tem involves a discussion on the communication network
as well as the power system security, which ultimately con-
cludes whether the current state of the power system is se-
cure or not. The proposed approach is capable of preventing
and detecting the malicious commands that target different
power components at the substation. The adversary can
either send a malicious command to the substation’s RTU
or alter a legitimate command that was sent by the control
center over the insecure network. The cyber-physical secu-
rity metrics, discussed in the previous section, are able to
identify and detect the malicious activities performed by the
adversaries. We consider a 24-substation power system with
42 buses, 62 lines, 8 generators, 27 loads, 6 transformers,
and 9 shunt capacitor banks. Tables 2, 3, and 4 represent the
system susceptibility metric, access points metric and threat
capability metric, respectively, for our power system case
study. The system susceptibility metric provides an attack
probability (Low, Moderate, High, and Critical) on different
power components: buses, generators, loads, transformers
and shunt capacitors. The access points metric records the
severity level (Low, Moderate, High, and Critical) of each ac-
cess point across the communication network and the power
system including the substation RTU, control center port
and routers. Numbers mentioned in Table 2 and 3 represent
the identity number of the component in the considered
topology of the communication network and the power
system case with 24 substations. The threat capability metric
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Fig. 5: Event logs maintained at the intermediate routers.
keeps the details of suspicious threats, such as malicious
source or destination IP, and altered data or commands.
Table 4 represents only the suspected records filtered by the
IDS or the operator, which helps to make and add new rules
to the IDS for strengthening the detection of such events or
actions in the future. There were one data threat suspect on
control center port 10, and 3 commands threat suspect on
RTU 6, 16 and 24, respectively.
Our approach also maintains event logs of the activities
performed at the intermediate routers, substation RTUs and
the control center. A sample event log at an intermediate
router is shown in Figure 5. Also, whenever an adversary
injects a malicious command into the communication net-
work, the IDS deployed at the substation sends an alert to
the control center. Synthetic meta-data for different param-
eters of the power system components is shown in Figure
6, which consists of lines (bus number to and from, line
circuit, line status, line MW and line MVR), buses (nus
number, bus name, bus per unit voltage and bus angle in
radius), generators (bus number, generator ID, generator
status, generator MW, generator MVR and generator voltage
set), loads (bus number, load ID, load status, load MW and
load MVR), transformers (bus number to and from, line
circuit, line status and line tap) and shunt capacitors (bus
number, shunt ID and shunt status). An operator responsi-
ble for coordinating and controlling the power system can
simulate the command and observe the real-time impact
of the command. An example is shown in Figure 7 where
a malicious command targets the opening of a generator
breaker. When the command is injected into the power
system, the breaker status changes from “closed” to “open”.
This unexpected and undesirable operation may result in
TABLE 2: System Susceptibility Metric
Components Low Moderate High Critical
Bus 1-12, 18,
35
17, 13-16,
37-42
20-23,
25-34
19, 24,
36
Generator 2-4 5 7-8 1, 6
Load 3-10, 26 1-2, 22-24 11-20 21, 25,
27
Transformer 2-5 1 - 6
Shunt 1-3 5-9 - 4
TABLE 3: Access Points Metric
Components Low Moderate High Critical
Substation
RTU
1-4 5, 7-14 16-23 6, 15,
24
CC Port 1-9, 11-18 19-24 10 -
Router 1 - 2 -
Fig. 6: A sample meta-data for different parameters of the
power system components.
Fig. 7: Legitimate vs. malicious command to open a genera-
tor breaker (Bus number 36, generator ID 1).
the shedding of electrical load since other generators in the
system may not be able to respond to sudden loss in time.
5.2 Performance Analysis
We developed an experimental setup with a co-simulator
[24]. The co-simulator uses JDK1.7 with JADE, MATLAB
and PowerWorld to simulate scenarios between the con-
trol center and the substation RTUs. Table 5 describes the
selected ranges of communication parameters for our simu-
lation. The co-simulator inherits the functionalities of Java-
based GridSim [4], which is a toolkit for resource modeling
that provides a rich functionalities for implementing the
communication network with a specific topology between
the nodes, and supports C37.118 protocol for packets with
message passing. Figure 8 shows the simulation in real-time,
where communication traffic generated by each substation
to the control center has its own data rate. If there is a delay
in sending a command by the control center to a substa-
tion, the communication traffic (blue dots) becomes slow
as compared to other substations. Similarly, if executing a
command results in opening a breaker at a substation, the
co-simulator can easily detect which breaker was recently
opened and the operator can check whether it was a legiti-
mate operation.
5.2.1 Overhead
The overhead generated by the proposed approach includes
packet scans by the IDS and command simulation by the
operator if the IDS flags the command as malicious.
5.2.2 Scalability
The proposed approach can detect single as well as multiple
malicious commands targeting power system components.
This is the author's version of an article that has been published in this journal. Changes were made to this version by the publisher prior to publication.
The final version of record is available at  http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSUSC.2018.2879670
Copyright (c) 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. XX, NO. X, XXXX 2017 10
TABLE 4: Threat Capability Metric
Threat Suspect Source IP Destination IP Timestamp Data Type Packet Size
(Octets)
CC Port-10 192.168.0. 3 192.168.0.7 23-Oct-16, 10:15:27 substation data 255
RTU-6 192.168.0.7 192.168.0.13 31-Oct-16, 21:32:11 command “open Gen 6” 125
RTU-16 192.168.0.7 192.168.0.23 5-Nov-16, 11:45:37 command “open Load 21” 127
RTU-24 192.168.0.7 192.168.0.31 10-Nov-16, 18:10:23 command “open Trans 6” 122
TABLE 5: Parameters for Simulation Setup
Parameters Range Value Unit
Baud Rate 100-9600 bits/s
Propagation Delay 10-500 ms
MTU/Packet Size 50-500/150-800 bytes
Number of packets 1-5 –
Fig. 8: Power system visualization by co-simulator inte-
grated with communication network.
This work specifically tested in a real power system en-
vironment, which was having 24 substations involving 42
buses. This is the reason why we modeled and simulated the
idea with 42-bus system. However, the simulator can easily
adopt and support several hundred buses based system
considering the fact that PowerWorld simulation supports
more than 10,000 buses [24].
5.2.3 Accuracy
The accuracy of the proposed scheme depends on the ability
of the IDS to detect suspicious commands based on their
behavior, target, action and timing. In general, the pro-
posed approach supports high accuracy because the effect
of each suspicious command is first analyzed using a co-
simulator. Then the output is presented to the operator who
makes an executive decision to accept or reject the com-
mand based on that information. The power system analysis
output includes a plot of the total system electric load
over time and the calculated System Aggregate Megawatt
Contingency Overload (SysAMWCO) for each timestep.
The SysAMWCO is a system-level power system security
metric. A transmission line AMWCO is equal to the sum of
megawatts of overload under a given set of contingencies. If
a line is never overloaded under a postulated set of contin-
gencies, the AMWCO is zero. The SysAMWCO corresponds
to the sum of the AMWCOs for all the transmission lines in
the system:
SysAMWCO =
∑
∀line
AMWCOline,
where the AMWCO for each line is defined as the product
of the aggregate percentage contingency overload (APCO)
and the MVA thermal rating of the line:
AMWCOline = APCOline ×MVA Ratingline.
In turn, the APCO for each line is calculated by summing
the percent overload for all contingencies that overload a
specific branch:
APCOline =
∑
contingencies
(% overload− 100).
The co-simulator is highly accurate in its ability to deter-
mine the attack status (attack versus no attack) of the grid
because the SysAMWCO is an efficient and reliable metric
that always indicates the presence of the attack. Note that
the SysAMWCO can also increase if there was an outage
in the power system for other reasons, for example a major
storm that damages power lines, or if there is a blackout.
Therefore, it is important to also rely on information from
the IDS in order to know if it’s due to a cyber-attack or
any normal power system reasons. Figure 9 compares the
actual SysAMWCO against the forecasted SysAMWCO over
a period of 40 seconds as the total system load initially
increases and then decreases. Using the current-day fore-
casted load, we simulate the system behavior assuming no
cyber-attack. This forecasted SysAMWCO fluctuates with
the load but is relatively stable. In real-time operations, a
malicious command attack occurs at timestep 5 (transition 4
to 5 in Figure 9). Suddenly, the SysAMWCO jumps to nearly
300. This large deviation from the forecasted SysAMWCO
signals the presence of a malicious command attack.
5.2.4 Robustness
The proposed approach is robust, which maintains the accu-
racy of the power system even with erroneous input, such
as malicious commands. In the general case, the malicious
command is flagged as suspicious by the IDS. Even if
the IDS does not detect the malicious command and the
command is executed on the real system, our approach can
detect the power system disturbance and report the effect
to the operator, who can take appropriate actions (such as
sending other control commands) to diminish the impact of
the previously executed malicious command.
5.2.5 Execution and Response Time
Our co-simulator simulates normal operations for 8
timesteps using the current-day next 40 seconds load fore-
cast. Each timestep represents a 5 seconds interval, and the
generated output for each iteration is stored in a file. The
co-simulator runs faster than real-time in the sense that
during real-time operation, the system compares the actual
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(a) Normal operation. (b) Malicious command injection operation.
Fig. 9: Detecting malicious operation at timestep 5 by comparing the SysAMWCO of the malicious operation against the
SysAMWCO of forecasted normal operation.
output against the simulated output parameters (AMWCO
and other system metrics of measurements). Using our
co-simulator, each output file is generated in less than 3
seconds, which is important in ensuring the fast response
time of the power system operator.
5.3 Limitations
The limitation of the proposed approach is that it has only
been tested using single and sequential malicious attacks.
The proposed approach will extend its support in the fu-
ture against coordinated attacks. Testing multiple attacks
is not straightforward, as it involves coordinated attacks
targeted infrastructures. This work assesses the impact of
malicious command attacks on the power system, which
itself involves a large piece of work: modeling malicious
command attacks, generating new IDS rules, and building
and implementing a new cyber-physical co-simulator using
Java, JADE, MATLAB and PowerWorld. Here, the idea is to
model the behavior of cyber-attacks into the power system
behavior so that the operator sitting at the control center
can understand that something is malicious and trace back
the malicious activities even when the IDS does not detect
completely. This probably is very difficult in the case of
coordinated attacks, as the IDS, deployed at substations,
will not be able to catch if something is malicious at op-
erator’s end, say a phishing activity or a botnet (which
are generally a part of coordinated attacks). A coordinated
attack comprises of comprising operator’s system, stealing
devices’ and VPN login credential, targeting DDoS attack
on communication devices, such as mobile, landline, or
communication node, i.e., router, updating firmware, and
sending malicious commands and perform other actions.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The paper presents an approach using a unique and novel
co-simulator to understand the potential impact of mali-
cious command-based cyber-attacks on the power system.
The generated output files, metrics and graphs help the
operator to understand changes in power system behavior
in the presence of cyber-attacks. The detection of a mali-
cious command takes place in real-time, and the operator
can quickly respond to protect the system from malicious
events in order to prevent cascading failures and eventually
blackouts. In the future, we will test this co-simulator on
significantly larger power system with a large number of
communication network nodes. The work will also extend
the proposed approach to understand the impact of coordi-
nated attacks on the power system.
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